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1 Introduction 
Much of South Africa’s environmental law is relatively new. Most of South 
Africa’s judges received their formal legal educations before promulgation of 
the major part of our environmental law and almost certainly before 
environmental law was taught at universities.1
 
 In recent years, there have been 
increasing instances of cases involving environmental matters coming to the 
courts. How are judges performing in these cases? It would appear that the 
judges’ performance is rather 'chequered' in environmental cases, which 
suggests that the judiciary needs to become more attuned to environmental 
law. I call this process, for purposes of this note, ‘greening the judiciary’. What I 
mean by this is not that judges must decide all environmental cases in a way 
that favours the environment, but that they must correctly consider, interpret 
and apply the relevant environmental law, and give environmental 
considerations appropriate deliberation. This note aims to identify, in admittedly 
somewhat general terms, the current state of environmental decision-making by 
judges and to suggest what needs to happen for such decisions to be 
improved. 
 
                                            
* This note is based on a paper presented at the Environmental Law Association 
Conference held in Cape Town, 24 February 2006. 
** B Com LLB, LLB, PhD (Natal), Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
1  Environmental law has been taught at some South African universities since the early 
1990s. By 2006, most universities are teaching it. 
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2 An overview of decided cases 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Director: Mineral 
Development, Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal 
Environment and Others2
 
 stated that: 
Our Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental 
justiciable human rights, by necessary implication, requires that 
environmental considerations be accorded appropriate recognition 
and respect in the administrative processes in our country. Together 
with the change in the ideological climate must also come a change 
in our legal and administrative approach to environmental concerns. 
 
 
Environmental lawyers heralded this decision as a beacon to light the way to 
future environmental decisions. 
 
Two years later, these same lawyers may have been forgiven for thinking that 
the court in the SAVE case had been issuing its pronouncements in a vacuum. 
The reason for this observation is two decisions: one by the Constitutional 
Court in Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental 
Association and Another3 and the other by the Durban and Coast Local 
Division in Merebank Environmental Action Committee v Executive Member of 
KwaZulu-Natal Council for Agricultural and Environmental Affairs and others.4
 
 
In Kyalami, the Constitutional Court, in probably the first significant case in 
which the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)5
                                            
2  Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining v SAVE 1999 2 SA 709 
(SCA). (Hereafter: SAVE case). 
 required 
consideration, got it plain wrong. First, the court (per Chaskalson P) suggests 
that NEMA revolves around the environmental implementation and 
management plans, ignoring the fact that these are one of many components of 
3  Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001 3 SA 1151 
(CC). (Hereafter: Kyalami case). 
4  Merebank Environmental Action Committee v Executive Member of KwaZulu-Natal 
Council for Agricultural and Environmental Affairs Unreported case no 2691/01 (D). 
(Hereafter: Merebank case). 
5  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
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the Act which are not any more important than the other components, which the 
court describes as ‘various other provisions’.6
 
 The court goes on to find that the 
environmental management principles in section 2 are not directed at 
"controlling the manner in which organs of state use their property". As I have 
argued elsewhere –  
…that the principles are directed at the manner in which organs of 
state use their property and, indeed, do anything that could affect the 
environment, could not be clearer from the wording of section 2(1).7
 
  
Further flawed interpretation by the court of section 2 of NEMA includes the 
failure to find that the principles can be applied in a dispute –  
 
…between members of the public and the government concerning 
activities that are not regulated by environmental implementation 
plans or other provisions formulated under [NEMA]… 
 
– and the finding that section 2 applies to activities that ‘will’ significantly affect 
the environment, rather than those that may do so, which is a critical difference.  
 
It could have been that the court deliberately misconstrued NEMA in order to 
ensure that its decision was the socially and politically appropriate one to reach 
in the circumstances. Whether this was the explanation or whether the flawed 
interpretation was due to plain and simple judicial error is not clear, but one 
expects a lot more from the highest court in the land. 
 
Expectations from a single judge in the Durban and Coast Local Division, on 
the other hand, may not be as high, but one still expects a judge to know what 
the law is. In the Merebank case, the court (Magid J) completely ignored 
section 32 of NEMA insofar as it applied to both the applicant’s locus standi and 
                                            
6  Ch 3 of NEMA provides for co-operative governance in the sphere of the environment, 
requiring government departments to submit environmental implementation plans (those 
plans to be submitted by departments exercising functions which may affect the 
environment) or environmental management plans (those plans required by departments 
exercising functions involving the management of the environment). The submission, 
scrutiny and status of these plans is addressed by ch 3 alone, which is one of ten chapters 
in the Act. 
7  Own emphasis, Kidd 2001 SAJELP 119-127. 
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the award of costs.8
 
 Bearing in mind that NEMA has been in force since 1 
January 1999, this is also inexcusable. There is, of course, the possibility that 
the relevant section was not brought to the court’s attention by counsel. We will 
return to this issue later. 
More recently, several judgments have begun to claw back the gains made by 
SAVE that were subsequently pegged back in Kyalami and Merebank.9 For 
example, in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, 
Environment and Land Affairs,10
                                            
8  S 32 of NEMA reads:  
 CJ Claassen J, in a clear and well-reasoned 
decision, reaches the conclusion that it is ‘abundantly clear’ that the 
consideration of socio-economic factors is an integral part of the respondent’s 
(1)  Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any 
breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act, including a principle 
contained in Chapter 1, or any other statutory provision concerned with the 
protection of the environment or the use of natural resources — 
(a) in that person’s or group of person’s own interest; 
(b)  in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons, 
unable to institute such proceedings; 
(c)  in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose 
interests are affected; 
(d)  in the public interest; and 
(e)  in the interest of protecting the environment. 
(2)  A court may decide not to award costs against a person who, or group of persons 
which, fails to secure the relief sought in respect of any breach or threatened 
breach of any provision including a principle of this Act or any other statutory 
provision concerned with the protection of the environment or the use of natural 
resources if the court is of the opinion that the person or group of persons acted 
reasonably out of a concern for the public interest or in the interest of protecting the 
environment and had made due efforts to use other means reasonably available for 
obtaining the relief sought. 
(3)  Where a person or group of persons secures the relief sought in respect of any 
breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act or any other statutory 
provision concerned with the protection of the environment, a court may on 
application — 
(a)  award costs on an appropriate scale to any person or persons entitled to 
practise as advocate or attorney in the Republic who provided free legal 
assistance or representation to such person or group in the preparation 
for or conduct of the proceedings; and 
(b)  order that the party against whom the relief is granted pay to the person 
or group concerned any reasonable costs incurred by such person or 
group in the investigation of the matter and its preparation for the 
proceedings. 
9  Note that it is not the intention of this note to comment on every decision which could be 
labeled ‘environmental’ – only those which assist in supporting the argument raised in this 
note. 
10  BP Southern Africa v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
2004 5 SA 124 (T). (Hereafter: BP-case). 
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environmental responsibility.11 In reaching this conclusion, the court considers 
the requirements of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199612
 
 
(particularly section 24), and the relevant legislation. Significantly, it does not 
follow the Constitutional Court’s narrow conception of the NEMA principles, 
holding that the respondent must: 
…promote sustainable development, which requires consideration of 
all relevant factors, including a minimisation of degradation of the 
environment if it cannot altogether be avoided, a risk-averse and 
cautious approach about the future consequences of decisions and 
actions taking account of the limits of current knowledge.13
 
   
This decision was followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC for 
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd 
and Another.14
 
 In this judgment the court emphasised that: 
…of particular importance is NEMA’s injunction that the 
interpretation of any law concerned with the protection and 
management of the environment must be guided by its principles. At 
the heart of these is the principle of ‘sustainable development’ which 
requires organs of state to evaluate the 'social, economic and 
environmental impacts of activities'.15
 
 
There are still decisions, however, where the courts appear to be strangers to 
relevant environmental legislation. In All the Best Trading CC t/a Parkville 
Motors and Others v SN Nayagar Property Development and Construction CC 
and Others,16 Patel J considers the locus standi of the applicants and holds, in 
essence, that an applicant seeking to protect its commercial interest may not 
rely upon environmental legislation in order to do so.17
                                            
11  At 151E. 
 This would appear to fly 
in the face of the finding in the BP-case that socio-economic considerations are 
12  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. (Hereafter: the Constitution). 
13  At 150H-151A. 
14  MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v SASOL Unreported 
case no 368/04 (SCA) judgment delivered 16 September 2005. (Hereafter: SASOL case). 
15  Par [15]. 
16  All the Best Trading CC t/a Parkville Motors v SN Nayagar Property Development and 
Construction 2005 3 SA 396 (T). (Hereafter: All the Best case). 
17  In this case the applicant, a filling station owner, was opposing the development of what 
would be a competing filling station nearby. 
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an integral part of environmental decision-making. What is of most concern 
about this judgment, however, is that the issue of the applicant’s locus standi is 
decided with no reference whatsoever to section 32 of NEMA. That section 
provides that: 
 
Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in 
respect of any breach or threatened breach of any provision of this 
Act, including a principle contained in Chapter 1, or any other 
statutory provision concerned with the protection of the environment 
or the use of natural resources — 
(a)  in that person’s or group of person’s own interest…18
 
The section does not refer to a person’s own environmental interest, and it 
would appear, therefore, on an interpretation of the plain language of the Act, 
that an applicant seeking to protect a commercial interest who was applying to 
the court for review of a decision authorised by environmental legislation (‘any 
statutory provision concerned with the protection of the environment or the use 
of natural resources’) would have locus standi on the basis of this section. This 
interpretation also accords with the purposive context of the Act. Even if this 
interpretation is wrong, the fact that the court completely ignored a provision 
which could be directly in point is unacceptable. 
 
 
A similar accusing finger could be pointed at the judgment in Capital Park 
Motors CC and Another v Shell South Africa Marketing (Pty) Ltd19 Claassen J 
finds differently to the court in All the Best in essentially the same factual 
situation, holding that an applicant seeking to challenge the development of a 
competitor (again a filling station) does have locus standi to challenge the 
development on environmental grounds due to the inclusion of socio-economic 
considerations in NEMA and the Environment Conservation Act.20
                                            
18  Emphasis added. 
 Yet, despite 
finding, correctly, in favour of the applicant, such a decision could have been 
made far quicker by reliance on section 32 of NEMA, which, once again, was 
not considered at all. 
19  Capital Park Motors v Shell South Africa Marketing Unreported case no 3016/05 (T). 
(Hereafter: Capital Park Motors case). 
20  Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. Par [17]. 
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It is not only the failure to consider environmental provisions which is apparent 
in certain decisions, but there are others where the relevant provision has been 
considered but misinterpreted. In Bareki NO and Another v Gencor Ltd and 
Others,21
 
 section 28 of NEMA, an important (albeit flawed), provision relating to 
the duty of care in respect of the environment was judicially considered for the 
first time. Unfortunately, the court got it wrong. It is beyond the scope of this 
note to analyse this judgment in detail (and I am sure that, given its importance, 
the judgment will receive critical analysis by others). In short, the court held that 
the duty of care required by the section (and the liability which flows from failure 
to comply with that duty), does not operate retrospectively (that is, before the 
date on which the Act came into effect). Most environmental lawyers were 
shocked by this decision, since it seems perfectly clear that the section does 
operate retrospectively. Not only does this interpretation (that is, the one which 
the court did not reach) rest on the plain meaning of the words used by the 
legislature –  
…every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant 
pollution or degradation of the environment must take reasonable 
measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from occurring, 
continuing or recurring…22
 
  
– but it can be argued compellingly that the national environmental 
management principles set out in section 2 of NEMA would require such an 
interpretation. These principles include (at least) the following principles which 
would support this approach: 
 
• The costs of remedying pollution, environmental degradation and 
consequent adverse health effects and of preventing, controlling or 
minimising further pollution, environmental damage or adverse health 
effects must be paid for by those responsible for harming the 
environment.23
                                            
21  Bareki v Gencor 2006 1 SA 432 (T). (Hereafter: Bareki case). 
 
22  S 28(1), emphasis added. 
23  S 2(4)(p). 
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• Responsibility for the environmental health and safety consequences of 
a policy, programme, project, product, process, service or activity exists 
throughout its life cycle.24
• Environmental justice must be pursued so that adverse environmental 
impacts shall not be distributed in such a manner as to unfairly 
discriminate against any person, particularly vulnerable and 
disadvantaged persons.
 
25
 
  
 
3 Environmental decision-making by the courts in future 
These judicial shortcomings are, in all likelihood, not solely the fault of the 
judges however. It is probable that the reason why these provisions were not 
considered is that counsel did not bring them to the courts’ attention. In light of 
this, I would argue strongly that the greening of the judiciary is not achievable, 
certainly not in any comprehensive sense, unless legal practitioners also are 
more closely exposed to the burgeoning body of environmental law, which is 
beginning to permeate many more ‘traditional’ areas of law. 
 
The situation at present then, is that, despite the appearance of several recent 
decisions which are disappointing from an environmental perspective, there are 
other cases where favourable decisions are being reached. But where do we 
go from here? The greening of the judiciary can be likened to a computer game 
where the player has to master successfully one level in order to proceed onto 
the next, more challenging, level.26
 
 The first level in the ‘game’ of greening the 
judiciary will be achieved once there is more consistency in the courts’ correctly 
considering, interpreting and applying environmental law. As illustrated above, 
there still are examples where this is clearly not happening. 
                                            
24  S 2(4)(e). 
25  S 2(4)(c). 
26  This analogy ought not to be interpreted as suggesting that the judging of cases is a trivial 
pastime – far from it! 
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Once this stage is reached, what, then, will the more challenging next level 
entail? One could reasonably expect that the next level would involve decisions 
in matters other than the authorisation of service stations.27 More seriously 
though, in order to determine the nature of the next level, let us consider the 
nature of the cases that are currently being decided. It is evident that the vast 
majority of cases that could be classified as environmental law cases in recent 
years have been decided on the basis of administrative law principles. In 
several, the environmental context is peripheral. In South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance v Head of Department: Department of Agriculture and 
Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal and Others,28
 
 the decision of the 
Department was grossly defective from the point of view of formal compliance 
with the empowering legislation. The fact that the impugned decision concerned 
an environmental authorisation was incidental. 
Similarly, in Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Another,29 a highly controversial 
decision on an environmental authorisation was set aside on the basis of failure 
of audi alteram partem. The environmental nature of the administrative decision 
was not germane to the court’s decision. This was also highlighted in Lloyd and 
Others v The Premier, Eastern Cape Province and Others,30
 
 where Froneman 
J decided the case on administrative law grounds, finding it unnecessary to –  
…express any views on many of the interesting novel and 
environmental issues raised and debated by counsel in argument.31
 
 
                                            
27  These cases all concern the authorisation of service stations: All the Best Trading CC t/a 
Parkville Motors v SN Nayagar Property Development and Construction 2005 3 SA 396 
(T); BP Southern Africa v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs 2004 5 SA 124 (T); MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs v SASOL Unreported case no 368/04 (SCA); and Capital Park Motors v Shell South 
Africa Marketing Unreported case no 3016/05 (T). 
28  South Durban Community Environmental Alliance v Head of Department: Department of 
Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal 2003 6 SA 631 (D). 
29  Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: DEAT 2005 3 SA 156 (C). 
30  Lloyd  v The Premier, Eastern Cape Province Unreported case no 333/2004 (E). 
(Hereafter: Lloyd case). 
31  Par [7]. 
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One would hope that administrators will, over time, become more au fait with 
the requirements of administrative justice. The consequence of this is that 
persons aggrieved by their decisions will not be able to challenge them as 
easily. It may be, however, that this is a naïve expectation and that some 
administrators will inevitably fail to comply with the letter of the law, or fail to 
provide everybody an opportunity to be heard, or reach an invalid decision on 
the basis of whatever other failure of administrative legality. When these cases 
come to the courts, these will, in my view, always be part of the first level of the 
game. 
 
Where, however, the administrators become more astute at complying with the 
requirements of administrative justice, those people wishing to challenge the 
decisions will need to become more creative and will be entitled to expect the 
courts to be operating at the next level as well. I will use a real-life example to 
illustrate where this thesis is heading. In the case of the N2 toll road through 
Pondoland, the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism was faced with 
numerous appeals against the decision to authorise construction of the road in 
a highly sensitive environment.32
 
 It is clear that many of the grounds of appeal 
were based on the merits of the decision, which would have involved 
environmental considerations of a scientific, technical kind. The Minister 
decided to set the decision aside because a member of the team who carried 
out the impact assessment, required to be independent by the applicable 
legislation, was a director of the company who would build the road. This was a 
shrewd decision because it did not require any consideration of the merits, 
allowing the developers a second chance to go through the authorisation 
process. The Minister essentially set the decision aside on review rather than 
allowing an appeal. 
Had the decision not been tainted by this defect (and assuming there were no 
other administrative law grounds of review relating to lawfulness or procedural 
fairness present), and the Minister had not been swayed by the arguments on 
                                            
32  The original authorisation was made in terms of s 22 of the Environment Conservation Act 
73 of 1989. 
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the merits, disallowing the appeal, where could the opponents of the road go 
next? Were they to challenge the decision on review in the High Court, the 
distinction between appeal and review, which is still very much part of our 
law,33 would mean that the court could not decide whether the decision was 
incorrect on the merits. The opponents would be confined to challenge the 
reasonableness or rationality of the decision. This is well illustrated in the case 
of Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts 
Products and others,34
 
 where Leach J states that: 
Pollution is therefore a complex, technical and scientific issue, which 
raises questions that can only be answered properly with insight into 
detailed scientific knowledge and information. It is presumably for 
this reason that certain functionaries, who hopefully are possessed 
of the necessary scientific background, have been appointed by the 
Legislature in order to weigh up all the relevant information 
necessary to enable them to take informed decisions on matters of 
scientific import, including the issue of a certificate for a scheduled 
process and the conditions which should apply thereto. Indeed the 
Legislature in s 6(3) of [the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 
of 1965] prescribes the [Chief Air Pollution Control Officer] to be a 
person ‘. . . who (is) technically qualified to exercise control over 
atmospheric pollution by virtue of (his) academic training in the 
natural sciences or engineering and (his) practical experience in 
industry together with a knowledge of the problems concerning 
atmospheric pollution related thereto’. These functionaries are pre-
eminently the persons who should take the decision which the 
applicant has now called upon this Court to make, viz whether the 
first respondent should be obliged to stop its operations. Without it 
being shown that the functionaries concerned have not exercised the 
discretion vested in them by the Legislature reasonably and properly, 
this Court would probably not be prepared to interfere by granting an 
order effectively usurping their powers and functions. 35
 
 
Whilst deciding whether a decision is reasonable or rational is not the same as 
deciding whether it is correct on the merits, the merits nevertheless play a very 
important role in the determination of reasonableness or rationality. 
                                            
33  Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) par 
[45]: "Although the review functions of the court now have a substantive as well as a 
procedural ingredient, the distinction between appeals and reviews continues to be 
significant. The court should take care not to usurp the functions of administrative 
agencies." 
34  Hichange Investments v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products 2004 2 SA 393 (E). 
35  At 412. 
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If the courts are to make a decent fist of deciding such matters, judges will have 
to appreciate the many, and often complex, scientific aspects of these 
decisions. They are not being asked to do so yet, because almost inevitably, 
there is a ground of review other than reasonableness or rationality present.36
 
 
Environmentally sound decisions, based on appreciation of the scientific merits, 
will require judges to 'graduate' to the next level of the game, where the further 
challenge will be to augment their legal skills with the skills necessary to grasp 
the essence of the relevant science. 
But is this really necessary? It may be argued that the very reason for the 
distinction between review and appeal is that judges are experts in law and not 
in the subject matter of administrative decision-making. As Justice Stevens 
states in the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Rapanos v United 
States: 
 
…one thing is clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps of 
Engineers to make the complex technical judgments that lie at the 
heart of the present case (subject to deferential judicial review). In 
the absence of updated regulations, courts will have to make ad hoc 
determinations that run the risk of transforming scientific questions 
into matters of law.37
 
 
Nor are judges expected to be experts in that subject matter. While this may be 
true up to a point, the danger of taking this view too far is that we run the risk of 
judges inevitably deferring to administrative decisions when they involve 
technical or scientific elements of any complexity. This would, in many cases, 
be detrimental to the environment and ultimately undermine the constitutional 
right in section 24 and the principles of sustainable development. My argument 
is not that the judges ought to be asked to decide these cases on the merits, 
but assessment of whether the decisions are reasonable or rational will entail a 
certain familiarity with the relevant technical and/or scientific considerations. 
                                            
36  This is somewhat of a generalisation. In the SASOL case, the SCA considered the 
rationality of guidelines relating to the siting of service stations and the authorisation of 
such service stations. The relevant considerations in this case, however, were not of a 
complex or especially technical nature. 
37  Rapanos v United States 547 US (2006). 
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4 Conclusion 
We must not expect the judges to embark upon, let alone master, the second 
level alone. They must be guided by argument raised by counsel and it is 
therefore critical that environmental lawyers embrace the scientific dimensions 
of environmental decision-making as well. In the Lloyd case, Froneman J 
observed that –  
 
…it is time for practitioners to realize that a more detailed 
acquaintance with the [Promotion of Administrative Justice] Act [3 of 
2000] is needed in applications to review administrative action, and 
to reflect that acquired knowledge in the manner in which review 
applications are brought before court.38
 
  
Much the same thing could be said about judges and legal practitioners, in 
respect of both environmental law and, as I have argued, the scientific 
underpinnings of environmental law. The development of a coherent and robust 
South African environmental jurisprudence depends on it. 
                                            
38  Lloyd v The Premier, Eastern Cape Province Unreported case no 333/2004 (E) at par [16]. 
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